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Abstract
Corporate managers and executive compensation in many industries place
signicant emphasis on measures of rm size, such as sales revenue or mar-
ket share. Such objectives have an important  yet thus far unquantied 
impact on market performance. With n symmetric rms, equilibrium welfare
losses are of order 1=n4, and thus vanish extremely quickly. Welfare losses
are less than 5% for many empirically relevant market structures, despite sig-
nicant rm asymmetry and industry concentration. They can be estimated
using only basic information on market shares. These results also apply to
oligopsonistic competition (e.g., for retail bank deposits) and strategic forward
trading (e.g., in restructured electricity markets).
Keywords: Delegation, forward trading, managerial incentives, market
structure, welfare losses.
JEL classications: D43, D61, L13, L22, L41.
My thanks are due to Patrick Legros (the Editor) and three referees for comments which
helped me improve the paper, and to Alberto Behar, Kohei Kawamura and John Quah for useful
discussions of earlier drafts.
1
1 Introduction
For imperfectly competitive markets, the prot-maximization hypothesis (see, e.g.,
Alchian, 1950 and Friedman, 1953) lacks the strong foundation that it enjoys un-
der perfect competition. Firmsstrategic departures from prot-maximization have
important consequences for market performance. This paper shows that welfare
losses due to imperfect competition are often small when rms (or their managers)
pursue additional objectives such as sales revenue or market share. For example, in
a symmetric linear duopoly, equilibrium welfare losses are only 4 percent. In other
words, 96 percent of the maximum possible social surplus is realized even in a highly
concentrated market with only two sellers.
Welfare losses due to imperfect competition have received much attention from
economists, especially since Harbergers (1954) controversial estimate that dead-
weight losses from monopoly power in U.S. manufacturing are less than 0.1 percent
of GNP. While some other empirical studies have obtained similar estimates, others
have found that welfare losses are signicantly higher in the range of 4 to 7 percent
of GNP or above (see, e.g., Cowling and Mueller, 1978). As a result, there has been
considerable debate about the appropriate empirical methodology to estimate wel-
fare losses, and, relatedly, about the limitations of available industry data (especially
on rm prots).1
More recently, on the theoretical side, Anderson and Renault (2003) examine
welfare losses under Cournot competition (with symmetric rms and homogeneous
products), and provide bounds in terms of the number of rms in the market and
demand conditions. Corchón (2008) shows that, although welfare losses are typically
quite small for Cournot competition with symmetric rms, they can be much larger
when rms have asymmetric costs.
Existing contributions to the literature assume either explicitly or implicitly that
rms are prot-maximizers. However, extensive evidence suggests that, in practice,
managers also place much emphasis on measures of their rms size, such as sales
revenue or market share. For example, competition for rankings in league tables
 based on size rather than prots  plays an important role in many sectors.
In the banking industry, information providers such as Thomson Financial and
Dealogic compile league tables based on the dollar volume of sales (rather than
protability) for di¤erent lines of business such as syndicated loans, initial public
o¤erings, and mergers & acquisitions. Industry reports make it plain that league
table rankings are a signicant source of managerial utility, and that banks are
1See Scherer and Ross (1990) for a detailed overview of this literature.
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willing to sacrice prots to improve their position.2
The rivalry between Airbus and Boeing in aircraft manufacturing focuses heavily
on the volume of plane orders and deliveries, with former Airbus chairman Alan Boyd
admitting to a strategy of pricing for market share(Yo¢ e, 1991). General Electric
famously pursued for many years the objective of being the largest or second-largest
rm (by sales) in each of its businesses. Similar objectives also feature prominently
in the semiconductor, automotive, and computer industries, as well as in competition
between stock exchanges.3
Moreover, there is substantial evidence that executive compensation is positively
tied to rm size (in addition to prots). Such a relationship has been found to hold
empirically across many di¤erent countries and over time, for both manufacturing
and service industries (see, e.g., Murphy, 1999 and Rosen, 1992) and in the banking
sector (see, e.g., Hubbard and Palia, 1995). Perhaps one of the earliest examples of
the impact of revenue-based managerial incentive contracts on competition comes
from the Dutch East India Company in the 17th century (Irwin, 1991).
The separation of ownership and control can function as a strategic commit-
ment to aggressive behaviour in product markets. In particular, it can be a prot-
maximizing strategy for a rms shareholders to use incentive contracts that reward
sales revenue in addition to prots (see Vickers, 1985 and Fershtman and Judd,
1987).4 Thus, the industry ends up in a prisonersdilemma: Collectively, it would
be better o¤ under prot-maximization but, individually, it is in each rms inter-
est to use sales incentives.5 An alternative interpretation of these models is that
managers propose such product-market strategies to shareholders, and the capital
market selects among competing proposals.
2For example, a recent press comment notes that rival investment banks will now be carefully
assessing whether to try and muscle in ... in order not to miss out on the fees and the valuable
league table credit so beloved of banksmarketing departments(Financial Times, 1 March 2010),
while another concludes it is time the banks stopped being so obsessed with league tables and
concentrated on generating revenues for their own shareholders(Financial Times, 22 April 2007).
3See, e.g., The Economist, 2 April 2009 on competitive conditions in semiconductors, Ritz
(2008) on incentives and compensation in the automotive industry, Berkson, Maged, Shah and
Tantzen (1997) on sales objectives in the U.S. computer industry, and Capaldo, Härle and Marrs
(2008) on competition between stock exchanges.
4These build on the insights of Schelling (1960) on the value of third-party commitment and on
the game-theoretical results of dAspremont and Gérard-Varet (1980). The result that managers
incentive contracts reward sales revenue relies on competition between rms being in strategic
substitutes (as is typically the case in Cournot markets).
5Other models in which size matters include those with switching costs and network e¤ects; see
Farrell and Klemperer (2007) for a recent survey. In contrast to strategic incentives, these tend to
revolve around intertemporal aspects of pricing and production. Moreover, size components enter
directly into a rms value function, so it is not clear why managerial incentives are separately based
on sales revenue. See also Zábojnik (1998) for a model in which sales incentives help strengthen
employee investment in specic human capital.
3
How large are welfare losses due to imperfect competition when rms employ
strategic incentives? While it is well-known that such departures from prot-maxi-
mization lead to lower prices, only very little attention has been paid to actually
quantifying their welfare impact.
This paper shows that, in the case with n symmetric rms, welfare losses are
of order 1=n4, and thus vanish extremely quickly. With at least three symmetric
rms, welfare losses are always less than 1 percent. So over 99 percent of maximum
possible social surplus is realized in the incentive equilibrium (see Proposition 2).
Amongst other things, this result closely matches Bresnahan and Reisss (1991)
empirical nding that entry beyond a third rm has virtually no further e¤ect on
the competitiveness of a market.
With asymmetric rms, welfare losses are higher because an ine¢ ciently large
fraction of industry output is produced by high-cost/low-quality rms. However,
with equilibrium incentives, an additional e¢ ciency e¤ect arises compared to prot
maximization: Since competition is more intense under delegation, rms with lower
costs (or higher product quality) capture larger market shares than in standard
Cournot markets. Put di¤erently, for a weaker rm to sustain a given  empir-
ically observed  market share, its disadvantage relative to other rms must be
smaller under delegation. This e¤ect very signicantly limits deadweight losses due
to imperfect competition.
Incorporating rmsstrategic incentives, welfare losses due to imperfect competi-
tion are below 5 percent for many empirically relevant market structures  despite
signicant rm asymmetry and industry concentration. For example, a simple suf-
cient condition for welfare losses to be less than 5 percent is that the market share
of the largest rm in the industry does not exceed 35 percent (see Proposition 4).6
Welfare losses are also small if rmsunit costs and product qualities are su¢ ciently
similar, or if there are su¢ ciently many rms in the industry (see Proposition 3).7
The paper derives these results based on a formula for equilibrium welfare losses
that uses only basic information on the distribution of rmsmarket shares (see
Proposition 1). Such industry data are often readily available to the analyst, making
it straightforward to put the formula into practice and estimate welfare losses for a
particular industry.
These results apply to a range of other settings in which competition between
6This condition is satised for many real-world industries (see Section 6 for more discussion).
Note also that a combined market share of no more than 35 percent for merging rms is often
considered to be a safe harbourunder the 1992 U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
7Note especially that none of these conditions are valid, in general, for Cournot competition
with prot-maximizing rms.
4
rms shares the same underlying strategic properties. For instance, they apply
equally to oligopsonistic markets in which managers pursue strategic incentives.
One topical example is competition between commercial banks for retail deposits
(one of their core business activities). There is a strong policy interest in the market
structure of the banking sector following the 20079 nancial crisis.8 The results
presented in this paper can be used to estimate welfare losses in a standard model
of deposit market competition, based on the observed distribution of banksmarket
shares.
A further application is the impact of forward trading on market performance,
which has recently received much attention in restructured electricity markets in
the U.K. and several U.S. states (see, e.g., Green, 1999 and Bushnell, Mansur and
Saravia, 2008). This paper shows that the seminal two-period forward contracting
model due to Allaz and Vila (1993) is strategically equivalent to the two-stage model
of managerial delegation. Propositions 1 to 4 thus directly quantify equilibrium
welfare losses, and provide conditions under which deadweight losses with strategic
forward contracting are less than 5 percent. This contrasts with much of the existing
empirical literature on deregulated electricity markets that focuses on estimating
price-cost margins (Lerner indices) as a proxy for welfare losses due to market power.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the bench-
mark model, and Section 3 derives its equilibrium conditions. Section 4 presents a
formula for equilibrium welfare losses. Section 5 discusses the case with symmetric
rms, while Section 6 analyzes the model with asymmetric rms. Section 7 presents
applications to competition between oligopsonists and strategic forward trading.
Section 8 discusses several extensions. Extension A considers non-linear demand
curves, and Extension B covers settings where entering rms incur a xed setup cost.
These show that the basic insights from the analysis  and the 5 percent upper
bound on welfare losses  extend well beyond the benchmark model. Extension
C analyzes a general model with non-linear demand curves, a xed setup cost, and
a generalized welfare function that may place greater weight on consumer welfare.
Using an equilibrium formula for generalized welfare losses (see Proposition 5), it
shows that losses tend to zero if either the number of rms grows large or if rms
demand curves are su¢ ciently convex (see Proposition 6).9
Section 9 o¤ers concluding remarks.
8For example, there are concerns about competition in the U.K. banking sector, notably since
the merger of HBOS and Lloyds TSB (two of the largest commercial banks) in late 2008.
9This extension also shows that  in contrast to standard Cournot competition  it is not
possible to construct examples in which (generalized) welfare losses are arbitrarily close to 100
percent in settings where rms pursue strategic incentives.
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2 Benchmark model
Industry parameters. Consider an industry with n  2 quantity-setting rms.
Firm j has unit cost cj, produces output xj, and has market share j = xj=X (where
X  Pnj=1 xj is industry output). Let cmin  minj cj denote the lowest unit cost,
and let max  maxj j denote the highest market share.
On the demand side, consumer utility is given by
U(x1; :::; xn) =
Xn
j=1
jxj  X2=2s. (1)
Letting pj denote rm js price, utility maximization yields a linear inverse demand
curve for rm j,
pj(X) = j  X=s, (2)
where j is a measure of demand for rm js product and s > 0 is a measure of
market size.10
This setup allows for both cost asymmetry (in the cjs) and demand asymmetry
(in the js) between rms. Demand asymmetry can be interpreted as reecting
di¤erences in product quality, that is, as vertical product di¤erentiation. Thereby,
consumers have a higher willingness-to-pay for a higher-quality product.11
It will be useful to let j  (j   cj) > 0 denote a protability index for rm j,
and also let max  maxj j. All else equal, a rm will be more protable if it has
higher product quality or lower unit costs.
Strategic incentives. Firms delegate decision-making in the product market to
their managers. Manager j maximizes

j = (1  j) j + jRj, (3)
a weighted average of rm prots j = (pj   cj)xj and sales revenue Rj = pjxj.
The game has two stages. In the rst stage, each rms shareholders choose the
incentive weight j to maximize their rms prots j. In the second stage, each
rms manager chooses an output level xj to maximize his objective 
j.
Managerspayo¤s are held to their outside option (which is normalized to zero),
10The main implication of the linear demand structure is that competition is in strategic substi-
tutes, so rms want to commit to more rather than less aggressive behaviour in product markets.
See Extensions A and C in Section 8 for further analysis with non-linear demand systems.
11For example, some computers (or computer parts) are more reliable than others (even though
they may all be functionally almost identical), some nancial institutions provide a faster or more
e¢ cient service than others, and di¤erent quality grades exist for numerous commodityproducts
such as aluminium, cement, crude oil, and steel.
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so all rents accrue to shareholders.
This paper follows the applied literature in assuming that such product-market
incentives form a credible commitment. A su¢ cient condition for this is that man-
agers contracts are observable and non-renegotiable. The standard justication,
given by Fershtman and Judd (1987), is that incentive contracts, in practice, are in
force for substantial periods of time, and that rms and managers eventually learn
about the prevailing incentive structure in their industry.
However, commitment value can obtain more generally in some settings. For
example, in an important paper, Caillaud, Jullien and Picard (1995) show that
(only) precommitments towards more aggressive behaviour  as considered in the
present analysis  may be credible even when renegotiation is allowed.12 See, e.g.,
Fershtman and Kalai (1997), Katz (1991, 2006), and Koçkesen and Ok (2004) for
further discussion and analysis of conditions under which credible commitments are
possible.
Social welfare. Social welfare is dened as the sum of consumer and producer
surplus, W (x1; :::; xn) = [U(x1; :::; xn) 
Pn
j=1 pjxj] +
Pn
j=1 j, or equivalently
W (x1; :::; xn) =
Xn
j=1
jxj  X2=2s. (4)
The marginal social surplus for product j is @W=@xj = j X=s. Thus, rst-best
social welfare involves industry output XFB = smax and so
W FB = (s=2)2max. (5)
The highest possible social welfare is achieved where all industry output is produced
by the rm with the highest protability index max (that is, the highest di¤erence
between product quality and unit cost). With symmetric product qualities (so
j =  for all j), there is a single market price that in rst-best is equal to the
unit cost of the most e¢ cient rm, p = cmin.
The main objective of the analysis is to quantify the (percentage) welfare loss
due to imperfect competition,
L = 1 W=W FB, (6)
which is also known as the relative deadweight loss; see, e.g., Tirole (1988).
12However, Reitman (1993) shows that non-linear incentives derived from stock options can
mitigate  and sometimes even fully o¤set  the pro-competitive e¤ect of strategic incentives.
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3 Equilibrium conditions
The game is solved backwards for the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. Manager
js rst-order condition in stage two (taking the incentive weight j as given) is
@
j
@xj
= (1  j) @j
@xj
+ j
@Rj
@xj
= 0. (7)
This condition implicitly denes manager js best response in the product market.
The Nash equilibrium of the stage occurs where all managers are simultaneously
playing their best responses. Thus let xj(1; :::; n) denote the equilibrium output
of rm j as a function of all managersincentive weights.
Note that these rst-order conditions also determine the aggregate best response
of other rms to a change in rm js output
dX j
dxj
=
P
k 6=j @
2
k=@xk@xj
 Pk 6=j @2
k=@xk@X j    j, (8)
where X j =
P
k 6=j xk.
Given the Nash equilibrium in the second stage, shareholders strategically choose
their managers incentives in the rst stage. The rst-order condition for rm j can
be written as
dj
dj
= [pj(X
)  cj + p0j(X)xj(1 +   j)]
dxj
dj
= 0, (9)
where a higher weight on sales revenue increases manager js output choice, dxj=dj >
0.13 The strategic e¤ect   j induces deviations from prot-maximization.
Combining the two rst-order conditions for rm j shows that equilibrium in-
centives are characterized by jcj = p
0
j(X
)xj  j. Whenever competition is in
strategic substitutes,   j < 0, rm js manager is given aggressive incentives for
sales revenue with j > 0. This induces the manager to expand output beyond the
prot-maximizing level, thus reducing prot margins and increasing social surplus.
4 Welfare losses
Incentives based on sales revenue induce parallel, outward shifts in rmsbest re-
sponse curves without changing their slopes. To see why, note from (8) that the
13This intuitive result follows by implicitly di¤erentiating (7), using the second-order conditions
to verify that @xj=@j > 0, and then noting that sign(dx

j=dj) = sign(@x

j=@j) by the stability
of equilibrium.
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strategic e¤ect   j depends only on the second-order properties of the other man-
agersobjective functions, 
k (k 6= j). Firm ks marginal revenue is simply marginal
prot plus marginal cost, @Rk=@xk = @k=@xk + ck. Thus, its objective function

k inherits the strategic properties of the underlying prot function k, and the
slopes of rmsbest responses curves are exactly the same as in a standard Cournot
model.14
With linear demand, the strategic e¤ect from (8) becomes
  j =  

1  1
n

  . (10)
Note that   < 0, so competition is indeed in strategic substitutes (and so incentive
contracts place positive weight on sales revenue, j > 0 for all j), and also that  

is a constant that is common to all rms. Any asymmetries in unit costs or product
quality thus also only a¤ect the levels but not the slopes of best responses. Finally,
observe that   !  1 as the number of rms grows large  intuitively, there is
more scope for strategic manipulation with more rms in the market.
Using the protability index j  (j   cj) and   j =  , the rst-order condi-
tion for manager js incentives from (9) can be written more compactly as
sj  X   xj(1 +  ) = 0. (11)
In the incentive equilibrium, rm j produces more output than rm k (xj  xk) if
and only if it has a higher protability index (j  k). So the rm with the highest
market share max also has the highest protability index max. The underlying logic
works in reverse too: Firms with higher market shares  as observed empirically
 have higher product quality and/or lower unit costs.
Welfare losses in the incentive equilibrium can now be determined using the
models three key components: The welfare function from (4), the equilibrium con-
ditions from (11), and the strategic e¤ect from (10).
Proposition 1 Equilibrium welfare losses
L(n; max; H) = 1  n(n+ 2H)
(n+ max)2
,
where n is the number of rms in the industry, max is the market share of the largest
rm, and H Pnj=1 2j is the industrys Herndahl index.
14Of course, the crucial di¤erence is that, under delegation, a rm exploits its ability to strategi-
cally inuence its rivalsoutput choices, whereas it does not do so in a standard Cournot equilibrium
(by construction, as this is a one-stage setting).
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Proof. Summing the n rst-order conditions from (11) and rearranging yields
equilibrium industry output
X =
s
Pn
j=1 j
[n+ (1 +  )]
. (12)
Plugging this back into the rst-order condition gives rm js equilibrium output
xj =
h
sj [n+ (1 +  
)]  sPnj=1 ji
(1 +  ) [n+ (1 +  )]
, (13)
so rm js market share
j =
h
j [n+ (1 +  
)] Pnj=1 ji
(1 +  )
Pn
j=1 j
. (14)
Using this, rm js protability index can, in equilibrium, be written as
j =
[1 + (1 +  )j]
Pn
j=1 j
[n+ (1 +  )]
. (15)
Now using (12), (13) and (15) in the expression for social welfare from (4) yields
W  =
s
2
 Pn
j=1 j
n+ (1 +  )
!2
[1 + 2(1 +  )H] , (16)
where H  Pnj=1 2j is the industrys Herndahl index. From (5), rst-best social
welfare W FB = (s=2)2max , and, using (15),
max =
[1 + (1 +  )max]
Pn
j=1 j
[n+ (1 +  )]
, (17)
so
W FB =
s
2
 Pn
j=1 j
n+ (1 +  )
!2
[1 + (1 +  )max]
2 . (18)
Since, from (10), the strategic e¤ect   =   (1  n 1), it follows that welfare losses
L = 1 W=W FB, in equilibrium, satisfy
L(n; max; H) = 1  n(n+ 2H)
(n+ max)2
, (19)
as claimed.
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Equilibrium welfare losses depend only on three variables: The number of rms
in the industry (n), the market share of the largest rm (max), and the Herndahl
index (H). These industry data are often readily available to the analyst, making it
straightforward to put the formula into practice and estimate welfare losses for a par-
ticular market. For instance, observing the vector of market shares f1; 2; :::; ng
is su¢ cient to be able to compute welfare losses.
Note also what welfare losses do not depend on:
First, conditional on rmsmarket shares, welfare losses do not depend on the
protability indices (the js), that is, on product qualities (js) or on rmsunit
costs (the cjs);
Second, a change in market size (s) also does not a¤ect the welfare loss. All else
equal, a market that is twice as large doubles both rst-best and equilibrium social
welfare, so their ratio and hence the (percentage) welfare loss are unchanged;
Third, welfare losses also do not depend on the (equilibrium) incentive weights
from managerscontacts (the js).
15 What matters in equilibrium is only the strate-
gic e¤ect   which in turn depends only on the number of rms in the industry.
Welfare losses are thus independent of (equilibrium) price elasticities of demand.
5 Symmetric rms
The properties of the formula for welfare losses are most easily explored by ini-
tially examining the case with symmetric rms before turning to the impact of rm
asymmetry.
With symmetry, product quality j =  (so the industry demand curve p(X) =
 X=s) and unit cost cj = c (for all j), so social welfare W =
R X
z=0
fp(z)  cg dz:
Proposition 2 If rms in the industry are symmetric (have identical unit costs and
product quality), then equilibrium welfare losses
Lsym(n) =
1
(n2 + 1)2
(i) are always less than 4% (for any n  2);
(ii) are less than 1% whenever there are at least three rms (if n  3).
Proof. The formula is obtained by setting max = 1=n and H = 1=n in the expres-
sion for L(n; max; H) from Proposition 1 and rearranging terms. Parts (i) and (ii)
of the proposition follow by inspection.
15The equilibrium incentive weight for manager j is easily backed out from the rst-order con-
ditions, which imply that jcj =
 
xj=s

(  ).
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The result shows that delegation of decision-making to managers with strategic
incentive contracts has a signicant impact on market performance:
In a symmetric duopoly, for example, equilibrium welfare losses are only 4 per-
cent. In other words, 96 percent of the maximum possible social surplus is realized
even in a highly concentrated market with only two sellers. With at least three
rms, the loss is always than 1 percent, so over 99 percent of maximum welfare is
achieved.
By comparison, the welfare loss due to monopoly (by setting n = 1) is large
at Lsym (1) = 25%. So, put di¤erently, the entry of the second rm eliminates 84
percent of the deadweight loss due to imperfect competition, and the entry of the
third rm brings this gure up to 96 percent. The social value of these rst few
entrants is therefore very high.
Amongst other things, this result closely matches the empirical nding of Bres-
nahan and Reiss (1991) that entry beyond a third rm has virtually no further e¤ect
on the competitiveness of a market.16 The reason here is that an additional rm not
only reduces price due to the standard entry e¤ect, but also intensies competition
indirectly because it enhances the strategic e¤ect of delegation.
As a rule of thumb, welfare losses with symmetry are of order 1=n4, and thus
vanish extremely quickly. Compared to prot-maximization, n sales-maximizing
rms under delegation act like n2 prot-maximizing rms would under Cournot
competition, so the industry is much more competitive.
6 Asymmetric rms
Welfare losses are higher when rms are asymmetric. With homogeneous products,
for instance, cost e¢ ciency requires all industry output to be produced by the rm
with the lowest unit costs. As pointed out by Farrell and Shapiro (1990), Lahiri and
Ono (1988) and others, this is typically not the case in Cournot-style markets.
Similarly, with vertically di¤erentiated products  but symmetric costs  max-
imizing social surplus requires all industry output to be supplied by the rm with
the highest-quality product. (Again, the standard Cournot equilibrium is ine¢ cient
in that low-quality rms have too large market shares.) More generally, the rm
with the highest protability index max would need to supply all output at a price
equal to its unit cost.
16Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) study entry and competition in ve retail and professional indus-
tries (doctors, dentists, chemists, plumbers, and tire dealers) across 202 geographic markets in the
U.S. It seems likely that rm asymmetries are limited within their sample of industries.
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With equilibrium incentives, however, an additional e¢ ciency e¤ect arises com-
pared to prot-maximization: Since competition is more intense under delegation,
lower-cost/higher-quality rms capture higher market shares than under Cournot
competition. Put di¤erently, for a high-cost/low-quality rm to sustain a given
market share, its disadvantage relative to other rms must be smaller under delega-
tion. This e¤ect very signicantly limits welfare losses due to rm asymmetry.
The following result characterizes the limiting cases.
Proposition 3 Equilibrium welfare losses L(n; max; H)
(i) are bounded above by 142
7
% for any n  2 (where this bound is tight for an
asymmetric duopoly with n = 2 and max = 45);
(ii) are lower than welfare losses due to a monopoly (where n = 1);
(iii) tend to zero as the number of rms grows large (as n!1).
Proof. See the appendix.
The market structure that maximizes welfare losses for Cournot competition
(with linear demand) involves a dominant rm with 50 percent market share to-
gether with a long tail of small, high-cost rms with innitesimal market shares
(see Corchón, 2008). This constellation leads to a welfare loss of 331
3
percent which
even exceeds the deadweight loss of 25 percent due to monopoly. By contrast, with
strategic incentives, welfare losses for this market structure are (approximately) zero!
Proposition 3(ii) and 3(iii) show that welfare losses with equilibrium incentives
are always lower than for a monopoly, and always tend to zero as the number
of rms grows large. The reason is again that more rms increase the scope for
strategic manipulation (as the strategic e¤ect   !  1). So the trick from
Cournot competition of adding a long tail of ine¢ cient rms to generate very high
welfare losses does not work. The result thus restores the traditional view that
monopoly is the worst possible outcome from a social standpoint  and the intuition
that many rmsis best.
Proposition 3(i) provides a theoretical upper bound on welfare losses in incen-
tive equilibrium of 142
7
percent, while allowing for arbitrary asymmetries in rms
product qualities and unit costs. The bound is tight for an asymmetric duopoly in
which the larger rm has a market share of 80 percent. Of course, this upper bound
is signicantly higher than the deadweight loss with symmetric rms  although it
is also still much lower than the monopoly loss of 25 percent.
Welfare losses tend to be highest for an industry with only few players in which
rm asymmetry takes a particular form: The leading rm has a large  but not
too large  market share and the remaining n  1 rms are symmetric.
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To understand why, observe that welfare losses L(n; max; H) from Proposition
1 are decreasing in the Herndahl index. Conditional on the number of rms and the
largest market share, more concentration is benecial since it implies greater cost
e¢ ciency (and/or a higher average product quality). This means that welfare losses
are highest if the n  1 non-leading rms have exactly symmetric market shares.
Furthermore, it is clear that a substantial welfare loss requires that the largest
rms market share is well above average. However, a very high max also implies
reduced allocative ine¢ ciency  since then almost all output is produced by the
strongestrm (with protability index max). Specically, the proof of Proposition
3 shows that the largest market share that maximizes welfare losses ?max 2 (37 ,45 ],
where 80 percent is for the duopoly case and ?max falls to around 43 percent as the
number of rms increases.
As a numerical example, consider a four-rm industry in which the observed
market shares are 1 = 40%, 2 = 30%, 3 = 20%, and 4 = 10%. So the largest
market share max = 40% and the industrys Herndahl index H = 30%. This
easily qualies as a highly concentrated marketaccording to the guidelines of the
U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission.17 Using the formula
from Proposition 1, equilibrium welfare losses L = 6
121
, or just below 5 percent. By
comparison, deadweight losses for this market structure under Cournot competition
would be more than three times as large at above 18 percent.18
Aghion and Schankerman (2004) note that the typical value of the Herndahl
index averaged across industries is about 10% for the U.S. and several industrializing
countries. Ali, Klasa and Yeung (2009) report an average Herndahl index of 6.4%
for four-digit SIC industries using the U.S. Census of Manufactures over the period
1982 to 2002. These gures imply a (very weak) upper bound on max of around
2535% (since certainly max <
p
H). Note also that a combined market share of no
more than 35 percent for merging rms is often considered to be a safe harbour
under the 1992 U.S. guidelines (see §2.211).
The following result shows that such an upper bound on max is su¢ cient for
equilibrium welfare losses to be small.
Proposition 4 If the largest rms market share max does not exceed 35% (with
17This statement holds under the U.S. Department of Justices 1992 Horizontal Merger Guide-
lines (revised in 1997), as well as under the latest revisions to the guidelines that were proposed
in April 2010 (and released in August 2010).
18For example, using the results from Section 4 of Corchón (2008). More generally, the formu-
lae from the present analysis, in conjunction with those from Anderson and Renault (2003) and
Corchón (2008), can be used to compare numerically welfare losses in incentive equilibrium with
Cournot competition.
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n  3 rms), then equilibrium welfare losses L(n; max; H) are less than approxi-
mately 42
3
%.
Proof. See the appendix.
Taken together, the results show that, with equilibrium incentives, welfare losses
due to imperfect competition are likely to be small for many empirically relevant
market structures  despite signicant rm asymmetry and industry concentra-
tion.19 In particular, welfare losses are bounded above by 5 percent if either (i)
rmsunit costs and product qualities are su¢ ciently similar (Proposition 2), or
(ii) if there are su¢ ciently many rms in the industry (Proposition 3), or (iii) if
the largest rms market share is su¢ ciently small (Proposition 2 and Proposition
4). Note especially that none of these statements are valid, in general, for Cournot
competition with prot-maximizing rms.
7 Further applications
Propositions 1 to 4 also apply to strategically equivalent settings with (A) compe-
tition between oligopsonists, and (B) strategic forward trading.
(A) Competition between oligopsonists. The above results apply equally to
oligopsonistic markets in which managers pursue strategic incentives. For example,
bank deposit markets are a natural application in that they often involve localized
competition between a relatively small number of banks with largely homogeneous
products. Moreover, deposit-taking is one of the core business activities of commer-
cial banks, and there is a strong policy interest in market structure and competition
in the banking sector following the 20079 nancial crisis.
Following Klein (1971), Hannan and Berger (1991) and others, consider the fol-
lowing simple model in which n  2 commercial banks compete for customer de-
posits. Bank j has unit cost cj, takes deposit volume Dj, and has market share
j = Dj=D (where D 
Pn
j=1Dj is total deposits). As above, let max  maxj j
denote the highest market share.
On the supply side, consumer (dis-)utility  U(D1; :::; Dn) =
Pn
j=1  jDj+D
2=2s.
Letting rj denote bank js deposit rate, utility maximization yields an inverse supply
curve rj(D) =  j+D=s for bank j. Suppose further that bank j invests its customers
19Numerical calculations also conrm that somewhat larger welfare losses in the double digits are
possible only in asymmetric duopoly and triopoly settings where the largest rms market share is
su¢ ciently close to ?max.
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deposits to yield an expected return j.
20 Let j 
 
j    j   cj

> 0 denote a
protability index for bank j, and also let max  maxj j. All else equal, a bank is
more protable if it has better investment opportunities (higher j), more favourable
deposit supply (lower  j), or lower unit costs (lower cj).
Banksshareholders delegate decision-making to their managers, and manager j
maximizes 
j = (1  j) j + jYj, a combination of prots j =
 
j   rj   cj

Dj
and gross income Yj = jDj. Social welfare is the sum of consumer and producer
surplus, and can be written as
W (D1; :::; Dn) =
Xn
j=1
jDj  D2=2s. (20)
The key point is that this setting is strategically equivalent to the model of Sec-
tion 2, with rmsoutputs replaced by banksdeposits and a simple reinterpretation
of the protability indices. First-best has the bank with the highest protability in-
dex taking all deposits DFB = smax (at an interest rate equal to its own investment
rate minus its unit costs), so rst-best social welfare W FB = (s=2)2max.
Aggressive incentives (with higher j) here, too, induce parallel, outward shifts
in bank manager js best response curve as dened by the rst-order condition
@
j
@Dj
= (1  j) @j
@Dj
+ j
@Yj
@Dj
= 0. (21)
Let Dj (1; :::; n) denote manager js equilibrium deposit choice as a function of all
managersincentive weights. As above, these rst-order conditions also determine
the strategic e¤ect   j  dD j=dDj (where D j =
P
k 6=j Dk). Given this, the
shareholders of bank j choose their managers incentives according to
dj
dj
=
 
j   rj(D)  cj
  r0j(D)Dj (1 +   j) dDjdj = 0, (22)
where dDj=dj > 0. With the linear supply structure, it is easy to check that   j =
  (1  n 1)   , so competition between banks is again in strategic substitutes.
Using the protability index j 
 
j    j   cj

and   j =  
, the rst-order
condition from (22) can be rewritten as
sj  D  Dj (1 +  ) = 0. (23)
Observe that this equilibrium condition, the welfare function, and the strategic
20These investments could represent a combination of interbank market loans to other nancial
institutions and the portfolio of securities held on the balance sheet. For simplicity, the model
focuses on welfare losses in the deposit market, without explicitly accounting for other markets.
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e¤ect are all equivalent to the previous analysis. Thus, the formula for welfare
losses from Proposition 1 also applies to this model, as do Propositions 2 to 4.
With strategic incentives, therefore, welfare losses due to oligopsony are less than 5
percent under the conditions previously identied.
(B) Strategic forward trading. The above propositions also apply to the seminal
model of strategic forward trading due to Allaz and Vila (1993). In contrast to
above, rms are assumed to be prot-maximizers, but there is scope for strategic
commitment via positions taken in the forward market. The impact of forward
trading on market performance has recently received much attention, particularly
in restructured electricity markets. For example, Bushnell et al. (2008) nd that a
Cournot model augmented with forward contracting commitments performs well in
simulations of market outcomes in three restructured U.S. electricity markets.21
In the rst period of Allaz and Vila (1993), rms can buy or sell contracts in the
forward market for delivery of a good. In the second period, rms produce under
Cournot competition in the spot market, given the forward market positions previ-
ously entered into. The forward market is e¢ cient with the no-arbitrage condition
that, in equilibrium, the forward price equals the spot price.22
Their model can be cast into the above framework as follows. The industry
parameters are exactly as in Section 2, while rms produce a homogeneous good
facing a linear inverse demand curve p(X) =    X=s. Social welfare is the sum
of consumer and producer surplus W (x1; :::; xn) =
Pn
j=1 jxj   X2=2s, with j 
(  cj) > 0 as the protability index for rm j. (This generalizes Allaz and Vilas
(1993) model to n  2 rms and asymmetric unit costs.23)
Let yj denote rm js sales in the forward market, and let pF denote the forward
price. In the second period, given its forward market position yj, rm j maximizes
the objective function

j = p(xj   yj)  cjxj, (24)
since revenue accrues only on the (xj   yj) non-committed units of production. The
21Bushnell et al. (2008) analyze a model in which electricity rms compete in both a wholesale
spot market and a retail market, and rmsretail positions play a formally identical role to long-
term forward commitments.
22Forward contracts are assumed to be binding and observable, and there is no discounting.
Note also that speculators make zero prots in the no-arbitrage equilibrium.
23Allaz and Vila (1993) do not incorporate capacity constraints, which may exacerbate rms
market power. Conversely, they show that additional periods of forward contracting magnify the
strategic e¤ect, so welfare losses will generally be even lower in such cases.
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associated rst-order condition
@
j
@xj
= p(X)  cj + p0(X)(xj   yj) = 0 (25)
implicitly denes rm js best response in the spot market. Let xj (y1; :::; yn) denote
its output choice as a function of all forward positions. These rst-order conditions
again determine the strategic e¤ect   j  dX j=dxj (where X j =
P
k 6=j xk). With
linear demand,   j =   (1  n 1)   , so competition is in strategic substitutes,
exactly as above.
In the rst period, rm js total prots are given by
j = (p  cj)xj + yj(pF   p), (26)
where the rst term reects operating prots, and the second term reects forward-
market prots. In equilibrium, the latter term is zero with an e¢ cient forward
market (for which pF = p). So rm js equilibrium prots j = (p   cj)xj , and it
chooses its forward market position according to
dj
dyj
=

p(X)  cj + p0(X)xj(1 +   j)
 dxj
dyj
= 0, (27)
where dxj=dyj > 0 (so more forward sales make rm j more aggressive in the spot
market). Using the protability index j  (  cj) and   j =  , this rst-order
condition can be written as
sj  X   xj(1 +  ) = 0. (28)
This shows that Allaz and Vilas (1993) two-period forward trading model is
also strategically equivalent to the model of Section 2. Although forward contracts
may seem quite di¤erent from managerial incentives, they here induce exactly the
same product-market outcomes because they share the same underlying strategic
properties.
Of course, it is well-known that forward sales make competition between rms
more aggressive and improve market performance. However, much of the existing
empirical literature on deregulated electricity markets focuses on estimating price-
cost margins (Lerner indices) as a proxy for welfare losses due to market power.
Propositions 1 to 4 go further by directly quantifying the welfare impact and showing
that equilibrium welfare losses under forward trading are less than 5 percent under
the conditions previously identied.
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The framework presented in this paper also claries the extent to which rms
engage in strategic forward trading. In particular, combining the two rst-order
conditions from (25) and (27), and setting   j =  
, shows that rm js equilibrium
forward market position satises
yj = (  )xj . (29)
Thus, in the subgame-perfect equilibrium, each rm sells forward the same propor-
tion of its output. Since    2 [1
2
; 1) for any n  2, this proportion lies between 50
percent (for a duopoly) and 100 percent (as the number of rms grows large).24 This
nding is broadly consistent with restructured electricity markets in which contract
cover is often 80 percent or more (see, e.g., Green, 1999 and Sweeting, 2007).
8 Extensions
This section discusses three extensions of the benchmark model from Section 2.
First, on the demand side, a consumer utility function that leads to non-linear
demand curves. Second, on the supply side, a xed setup cost incurred by rms
that have entered the market. Third, some general results on welfare losses that
apply with non-linear demand, xed setup costs, and a generalized welfare function.
To my best knowledge, this section provides the rst solution to a model of
strategic incentives with asymmetric rms and a non-linear demand system. The
three extensions draw upon formulae contained in the proof of Proposition 5 in the
appendix (which contains a full set of derivations for the general model).
Consistent with the benchmark model, this section considers situations where
the vector of rmsmarket shares is observed by the analyst  and thus is invariant
to changes in the details of model specication. For example, although a change in
demand curvature will generally lead to changes in rmsimplied (yet unobserved)
protability indices  and also in equilibrium welfare losses  it does not alter
rmsobserved market shares (or the observed number of rms in the industry).25
24This also makes clear that rms would become forward buyers in a setting with competition in
strategic complements (that is,   > 0). See also Mahenc and Salanié (2004) who make a related
point in a model of di¤erentiated-products Bertrand competition.
25This contrasts with the usual theoretical approach of initially specifying rmsdemands and
costs, and then deriving equilibrium entry, market shares, prices, welfare, and so on, for a particular
model of competition. Instead, with a view to empirical implementation, my approach starts with
the observed number of rms and their market shares, then implicitly works backwardsto nd
the implied protability indices, and thus calculates equilibrium welfare losses.
My approach therefore also allows comparisons between equilibria with strategic incentives and
standard Cournot competition for a given, empirically observed, market structure.
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A Non-linear demand
Consider the benchmark model from Section 2 with a more general consumer utility
function
U(x1; :::; xn) =
Xn
j=1
jxj  X+1=( + 1)s, (30)
so the inverse demand curve for rm j becomes
pj(X) = j  X=s. (31)
As before, j is a measure of demand for rm js product (e.g., its quality) and
s > 0 is a measure of market size. In addition,  is an index of demand curvature:
Demand is convex (concave) if   1 (  1), and higher values of  correspond to
more concavedemand.
Many familiar demand curves are nested as special cases of this formulation. For
example, it includes all four demand specications used by Genesove and Mullin
(1998) in an inuential empirical study of the U.S. sugar industry. In particular,
demand (i) is linear if  = 1, (ii) is quadratic if  = 1
2
, (iii) is exponential in the
limit as  ! 0 (for which pj(X) = j   log(X)=s), and (iv) has constant elasticity
of  1= > 0 if j = 0 (for all j) and s < 0.26
Demand is not too convex in that  >  j=(1 j) (for j = 1; 2 with n = 2), and
 >  1 for n  3. These assumptions are necessary and su¢ cient for competition
between rms to be in strategic substitutes (i.e., the strategic e¤ect   j < 0 for
all j) for any distribution of rmsmarket shares. They also ensure that consumer
surplus S = U(x1; :::; xn) 
Pn
j=1 pjxj is well-behaved and nite.
Social welfare, the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus, is given by
W (x1; :::; xn) =
Xn
j=1
jxj  X+1=( + 1)s. (32)
So rst-best social welfare involves industry output XFB = (smax)
1= and thus
W FB =

( + 1)
s1=(+1)=max . (33)
Observe that the two rst-order conditions from (7) and (9) in Section 3 are valid
also for non-linear demand. Using the rst-order condition for manager js output
26Genesove and Mullin (1998) focus on the case with homogenenous products (that is, j = ).
Their approach has been employed and extended in various papers, including recently in empirical
work by Clay and Troesken (2003) and applied theory by Verboven and van Dijk (2009).
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choice, @
j=@xj = 0, it is straightforward to calculate the generalized strategic e¤ect
dX j
dxj
=  

(n  1)  (1  j)(1  )
n  (1  j)(1  )

   j < 0. (34)
With non-linear demand, therefore, the strategic e¤ect di¤ers across rms (so   j 6=
  k for j 6= k); it is more negative for larger (smaller) rms if demand is concave
(convex). Note that, in general,   j is more negative for a more concave demand
curve (that is,   j declines as  increases). Moreover, the strategic e¤ect   j !  1
either if the number of rms grows large, n ! 1 (as in the benchmark model), or
if demand becomes very concave,  !1.
The rst-order condition for rm js choice of incentives, dj=dj = 0, can be
written as
sj   (X)

1 + j(1 +   j)

= 0. (35)
Welfare losses can again be determined using the models three key components: The
welfare function from (32), the equilibrium conditions from (35), and the strategic
e¤ects from (34).
Symmetric rms. The formula for welfare losses is again relatively simple if rms
are symmetric in terms of their unit costs and product qualities,
Lsym(n; ) = 1 

1 +
( + 1)
n2   (n  1)(1  )


1 +

n2   (n  1)(1  )
(+1)= .
Table 1 presents numerical results for a variety of demand specications, includ-
ing the four used by Genesove and Mullin (1998). The two most convex demand
curves are those with constant elasticity, one as the limiting case with unit-elasticity
( !  1) and the other with a price elasticity of two ( =  1
2
). The next three
demand curves, exponential ( ! 0), quadratic ( = 1
2
), and linear ( = 1), are all
convex (at least weakly). Finally, I also present welfare losses for three strictly con-
cave demand curves: Two moderately concave demand curves ( = 2 and  = 3),
as well as the limiting case where demand becomes rectangular ( !1).
These results are quantitatively similar to those for the linear case from Propo-
sition 2 (with  = 1), while allowing for a much more general class of demand func-
tions. It turns out that welfare losses are maximized at approximately 41
2
percent
for a duopoly with exponential demand (that is, n = 2 and  ! 0). They are less
than approximately 1 percent for any industry with three or more symmetric rms.
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As expected, market performance improves as the number of rms increases, and
it is clear that the rule of thumb that symmetric welfare losses are of order 1=n4 is
robust to di¤erent demand specications.
With symmetric rms, equilibrium welfare losses are therefore bounded above
by 5 percent for any number of rms and any demand curvature. Moreover, they
tend to zero under any of the following conditions: (i) The number of rms grows
large (as n!1), or (ii) demand becomes very convex (as  !  1), or (iii) demand
becomes very concave (as  !1).
Table 1: Equilibrium welfare losses (in percent) with symmetric rms
Demand curvature ()
Number of
rms (n)
 1  1
2
0 1
2
1 2 3 1
2 0.00 4.00 4.46 4.30 4.00 3.41 2.94 0.00
3 0.00 0.69 0.93 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.86 0.00
4 0.00 0.19 0.28 0.33 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.00
5 0.00 0.07 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.00
6 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.00
7 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.00
8 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.00
9 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00
10 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Asymmetric rms. Welfare losses can again be signicantly higher when rms
are asymmetric. In particular, with non-linear demand, equilibrium welfare losses
L(n; max; eH; ) = 1 
"
1 + ( + 1)
eH
n
#

1 +
max
n  (1  max)(1  )
(+1)= ,
where eH Xn
j=1

n2j
n  (1  j)(1  )

is the industrys adjusted Herndahl index.27
27Note that eH = Pnj=1 2j  H if rmsdemand curves are linear (with  = 1).
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With non-linear demand, welfare losses again depend on the number of rms in
the market (n) and the largest rms market share (max). However, they now also
depend on demand curvature (), as well as on the entire vector of market shares,
f1; 2; :::; ng. In contrast to the case with linear demand, the standard Herndahl
index is no longer a su¢ cient statistic for the distribution of market shares.28
By inspection, welfare losses tend to zero as (i) the number of rms grows large
(as n ! 1) or (ii) demand becomes very convex (as  !  1). The rst point
conrms the basic insight from the benchmark model that many rms leads to
the socially optimal outcome in a setting with strategic incentives. The second point
is important because it shows that, despite rm asymmetries, welfare losses with a
convex demand curve must  at least in some cases  be smaller than they are
for linear demand.
Observe that equilibrium welfare losses L(n; max; ; eH) with non-linear demand
are decreasing in the adjusted Herndahl index, eH. As with linear demand, there-
fore, higher concentration is benecial as it implies greater e¢ ciency (conditional
on the number of rms and the largest rms market share).29 So welfare losses are
again highest if the n  1 non-leading rms have exactly symmetric market shares.
Table 2 thus explores the impact of demand curvature using numerical results
for an industry in which the largest rm has a market share of 35 percent and
the remaining rms are symmetric. Further numerical calculations conrm that, as
expected, these are maximal welfare losses  losses are always lower than in Table
2 if the largest rms market share is less than 35% (for a given number of rms).
These results show that the 5 percent upper bound on welfare losses extends
well beyond the benchmark case with linear demand. In particular, maximal welfare
losses are uniformly lower than this for any convex demand curve (with   1) and
also for very slightly concave demand ( ' 1). So the bound applies to all four
demand specications considered by Genesove and Mullin (1998). These numerical
results thus extend Proposition 4 from the benchmark model to settings with non-
linear demand curves.
28The reason is that the strategic e¤ect   j varies across rms, so each individual rms char-
acteristics now play a role in determining the equilibrium level of industry output.
29The adjusted Herndahl index shares the property that it is increasing and convex in individual
rms market shares with the standard Herndahl index. In particular, straightforward calculations
show that
@ eH
@j
= n
Xn
j=1
(
2j [n  (1  )] + (1  )2j
[n  (1  j)(1  )]2
)
> 0
and
@2 eH
@2j
= 2n
Xn
j=1
(
[n  (1  )]2
[n  (1  j)(1  )]3
)
> 0.
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Welfare losses are partially above this bound for the two moderately concave
demand curves ( = 2 and  = 3), for which welfare losses range approximately
from 2 percent to 7 percent for the most relevant numbers of rms. (It is worth
recalling that these are maximal welfare losses; any asymmetry among smaller rms
implies smaller losses.)
Table 2 also shows that it is possible for welfare losses with asymmetric rms to
be much higher if rmsdemand curves are strongly concave. In such cases, welfare
losses are in the double digits for a wide range of market structures, and may be
as high as in the low 20s. However, it is somewhat di¢ cult to judge the empirical
relevance of these cases as such demand specications  although theoretically
admissible  are only very rarely used in applied work.30
Table 2: Maximal equilibrium welfare losses (in percent) with max  35%
Demand curvature ()
Number of
rms (n)
 1  1
2
0 1
2
1 2 3 1
3 0.00 1.02 1.52 1.79 1.96 2.15 2.24 2.41
4 0.00 1.53 2.68 3.59 4.31 5.41 6.20 11.06
5 0.00 1.54 2.79 3.82 4.69 6.06 7.09 14.55
6 0.00 1.44 2.65 3.67 4.56 6.01 7.14 16.44
7 0.00 1.31 2.45 3.43 4.30 5.75 6.91 17.62
8 0.00 1.20 2.25 3.18 4.01 5.43 6.59 18.43
9 0.00 1.10 2.07 2.95 3.74 5.10 6.25 19.01
10 0.00 1.01 1.91 2.74 3.49 4.80 5.91 19.46
20 0.00 0.54 1.06 1.55 2.01 2.88 3.68 21.25
1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
In sum, for demand curves commonly used in empirical work, equilibrium welfare
losses are typically similar to  or often lower than  welfare losses with linear
demand. With symmetric rms, the rule of thumb that welfare losses are of order
1=n4 applies generally. The 5 percent upper bound on welfare losses also extends
well beyond the linear case. However, welfare losses may be signicantly higher
in situations where rms demand curves are su¢ ciently concave and there is a
particular kind of asymmetry in their market shares.
30In principle, demand curvature can be estimated using non-linear regression techniques as long
as su¢ ciently rich data on prices and quantities are available. However, I am not aware of any
empirical work in industrial organization that attempts to estimate curvature directly.
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B Fixed entry costs
Consider the benchmark model from Section 2 but now suppose that each rm incurs
a xed setup cost K whenever it has entered the market. Firms are symmetric in
terms of unit costs and product qualities, and the demand curve p(X) =    X=s
is linear. There is a large pool of potential entrants, and an active rm js prots
j = (p  c)xj  K.
Social welfare, the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus, becomes
W (X) = X ( X=2s)   nK, where   (  c). The rst-best outcome involves
a single rm entering the market, and producing industry output XFB = s. So
rst-best social welfare W FB = (s=2)2 K, where the setup cost is assumed to be
su¢ ciently low to allow welfare-enhancing entry of at least one rm, K < (s=2)2.
Observe that the strategic e¤ect and the equilibrium conditions from the bench-
mark analysis in Section 3 also continue to apply in this setting.31 The formula for
welfare losses therefore only has to take into account the adverse impact associated
with the duplication of xed costs,
L(n;K) =
1
(n2 + 1)2
+ (n  1) K
(s=2)2
1  K
(s=2)2
 .
As expected, the result from Proposition 2 is nested for zero setup costs (K = 0),
and welfare losses are increasing in the setup cost.
The main complication is that K is typically not easily observable to the analyst.
However, with symmetric rms, it is possible to derive upper and lower bounds based
on rmsentry decisions. In particular, the equilibrium prots of a symmetric rm
are given by
(n) =
n
(n2 + 1)2
s2  K
and since the nth rm has chosen to enter the market,
(n)  0, K  2n
(n2 + 1)2
(s=2)2  K.
Slightly abusing notation, rm (n+ 1)s decision not to enter implies that
(n+ 1) < 0, K > 2(n+ 1)
[(n+ 1)2 + 1]2
(s=2)2  K,
31For a given number of rms in the market, the entry cost has no e¤ect on the equilibrium
outcome in terms of prices and quantities.
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so welfare losses in free-entry equilibrium L(n;K) are bounded according to
L(n;K) < L(n;K)  L(n;K).
Table 3 presents numerical calculations, including for K = 0 as comparison.
Table 3: Welfare losses (in percent) in free-entry equilibrium with setup cost K
Number of
rms (n)
Zero setup cost
(K = 0)
Minimum K
(K =K)
Maximum K
(K =K)
2 4.00 10.64 23.81
3 1.00 6.72 13.83
4 0.35 4.86 8.90
5 0.15 3.69 6.16
6 0.07 2.89 4.50
7 0.04 2.32 3.42
8 0.02 1.90 2.68
9 0.01 1.59 2.16
10 0.01 1.34 1.78
20 0.00 0.41 0.47
1 0.00 0.00 0.00
Welfare losses can be signicantly higher if rms incur xed setup costs. The
maximal welfare loss is in the double digits for duopoly and triopoly models, and,
with a small number of rms, is roughly twice as large as the minimal loss.
Nonetheless welfare losses remain below 5 percent for many market structures;
this upper bound applies to minimal losses L(n;K) for n  4, and to maximal losses
L(n;K) for n  6. This contrasts sharply with standard Cournot competition, for
which the range of possible welfare losses with n = 6 is given by 18:2 to 23:4 percent,
and for which the number of rms needed for welfare losses to be less than 5 percent
in free-entry equilibrium is n  38.32
Of course, the notion of rst-best is stronger with a setup cost than in the
benchmark model. First, the regulator is assumed to control rmspricing behaviour
as well as their entry behaviour. Second, the single producing rm now has negative
operating prots (since price lies below average cost). So it is implicit that the
regulator can compensate the rm with a transfer payment  but without creating
any additional distortions or ine¢ ciency.
32For example, using the results from Section 3 of Corchón (2008).
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Moreover, although standard in the literature (see, e.g., Mankiw and Whinston,
1986, and Corchón, 2008), it is clear that the assumption that rms are completely
symmetric (in terms of marginal cost, product quality, and xed cost) is rather
strong. As emphasized by Vickers (1995), this symmetry assumption deprives com-
petition of one of its most basic functions  selecting the most e¢ cient rms. It also
means that these models cannot replicate an observed distribution of rmsmarket
shares f1; 2; :::; ng that almost certainly involves asymmetries.
A richer model allows for heterogenous unit costs and product qualities, while
retaining the assumption that the xed cost is identical across rms, so rst-best
welfare W FB = (s=2)2max  K. The maximum setup cost K is pinned down by the
rm with the smallest market share, min  minj j < n 1, which also makes the
smallest prot,
min = minj 

j = (s=2)
2
max
2n2min
(n+ max)
2  K.
Since this rm has decided to enter the market,
min  0, K 
2n2min
(n+ max)
2 (s=2)
2
max  K.
The key observation is that the maximum entry cost K is of the order of 2min. So
the market presence of a rm with a smallmarket share  even as high as 5 or 10
percent  implies a rather low value for K. This in turn means that welfare losses
are not much above those from the benchmark analysis with a zero entry cost.33
Using the last expression for K shows that equilibrium welfare losses with asym-
metric rms and a xed setup cost are thus bounded by
L  1  n [(n+ 2H)  2n
2
min]
(n+ max)
2   2n2min
  L(n; max; min; H).
So Proposition 4 also applies, with slight modications, to the case with xed
entry costs. In particular, welfare losses are below 5 percent if the largest rms
market share is no greater than 35 percent and (i) the smallest rms market share
is su¢ ciently small or (ii) the number of rms in the industry is su¢ ciently large.
In sum, xed costs generally increase equilibrium welfare losses, possibly by a
signicant amount. With symmetric rms, the 5 percent upper bound on welfare
losses still applies in free-entry equilibrium if there are at least four to six rms in
33Without symmetry, it is not possible to infer a minimum xed entry cost in the absence of
additional information on the characteristics of rms that have chosen not to enter the market.
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the market. With asymmetric rms, the impact of the setup cost remains modest
essentially if the smallest rm in the industry is su¢ ciently small.
C General results
This last extension considers a more general model that combines the features of the
two preceding extensions. On the demand side, the consumer utility function from
(30) yields a non-linear demand curve pj(X) = j  X=s for rm j. On the supply
side, rm j has protability index j  (j   cj), and prots j = (pj   cj)xj  K
(with equilibrium prots j  0).
The generalized welfare function
cW () = S +  nX
j=1
j, (36)
where S is consumer surplus, and  2 [0; 1] is the weight placed on producer surplus.
A total surplus standard, as in the above analysis, corresponds to  = 1; a consumer
welfare standard is given by  = 0. The generalized welfare loss is dened as
bL() = 1 cW ()=W FB. (37)
I continue to associate the rst-best outcome with the rm with highest prof-
itability index max producing where pj(XFB) = cj, and so
W FB =

( + 1)
s1=(+1)=max  K. (38)
Again, the setup cost is su¢ ciently low that W FB =
 
SFB  K > 0, where SFB is
the rst-best consumer surplus.
Note that the equilibrium conditions and strategic e¤ects derived in Extension
A for non-linear demand also apply in this generalized setup.
Proposition 5 Generalized equilibrium welfare losses
bL(n; max; eH; ;K=S; ) = 1  1 + 
"
( + 1)
eH
n
  nK
S
#

1 +
max
n  (1  max)(1  )
(+1)=
  K
S
,
where eH Xn
j=1

n2j
n  (1  j)(1  )

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is the industrys adjusted Herndahl index, and
S =

( + 1)
s1=
2664
Xn
j=1
j
n+
Xn
j=1

j
n  (1  j)(1  )

3775
(+1)=
is equilibrium consumer surplus.
Proof. See the appendix.
(The formulae for equilibrium welfare losses used in Extensions A and B are
nested as special cases of Proposition 5.)
Unsurprisingly, the informational requirements for estimating welfare losses are
now stronger. Compared with the benchmark model, the additional parameters are
(i) the weighting on producer surplus in the regulators welfare function , (ii) the
entire vector of rmsmarket shares f1; 2; :::; ng, (iii) an assumption, estimate,
or bounds for demand curvature , and (iv) an assumption, estimate, or bounds for
the ratio of the setup cost to equilibrium consumer surplus K=S.34
Given its complexity, welfare losses in this generalized model are perhaps best
examined on a case-by-case basis using the actual distribution of market shares
from a real-world industry. But the above discussion shows that, in principle, such
estimation is feasible (and straightforward) in a practical setting.
I now examine some of the limiting properties of generalized welfare losses. The
key step is to recognize that they can be bounded above as follows:
bL() = 1 cW ()=W FB (by denition)
 1  S=W FB (since cW ()  S for any  2 [0; 1])
 1  S=SFB (since SFB  W FB for any K  0). (39)
So, for any weight on producer surplus  2 [0; 1] and any xed cost K  0, general-
ized welfare losses are no greater than welfare losses in terms of consumer surplus,bL()  1  S=SFB.
34It is again possible to derive a maximum setup cost using the smallest rms decision to enter
the market because it makes non-negative prots,
min  0,
K
S


( + 1)2min
n  (1  min)(1  )

,
where the right-hand side consists only of parameters for which information or estimates are oth-
erwise already available. (It is easy to check that, as before, a rm with a smaller market share j
makes lower equilibrium prots j in the generalized model.)
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Since equilibrium consumer surplus relative to its rst best is given by
S
SFB
=

1 +
max
n  (1  max)(1  )
 (+1)=
, (40)
the next proposition follows.
Proposition 6 For any  2 [0; 1], generalized equilibrium welfare losses bL()
(i) tend to zero as the number of rms grows large (as n ! 1) or as demand
becomes very convex (as  !  1);
(ii) are bounded above by the largest rms market share, bL()  max.
Proof. For part (i), note from (40) that S=SFB increases with the number of rms
n, and that limn!1
 
S=SFB

= 1, and also that lim! 1
 
S=SFB

= 1. For part
(ii), note that S=SFB decreases with demand curvature , and lim!1
 
S=SFB

=
1  max. The results now follows since bL()  1  S=SFB by (39).
Part (i) shows that the nding from previous numerical simulations is general:
Welfare losses tend to zero if either the number of rms grows large or if demand be-
comes very convex. So, importantly, generalized welfare losses with convex demand
must, over some range, be lower than in the benchmark case with linear demand.
Part (ii) shows that losses never exceed the largest rms market share. This
result holds across a wide range of models  including all the special cases examined
above  and also if the welfare standard is geared towards consumers (with  < 1).
The general result is, of course, also weaker because the largest market share in an
industry is often 20 percent, 30 percent, or higher.
Perhaps the key observation, however, is that welfare losses are not arbitrary
in this generalized model. In other words, they can not be made arbitrarily close to
100 percent by appropriate choice of parameter values (since max < 1, and, indeed
often max << 1). This again stands in sharp contrast to the standard model of
Cournot competition with prot-maximizing rms, for which Corchón (2008) shows
that welfare losses are indeed arbitrary in some cases.
Two nal points arise from the fact that the upper bound on generalized welfare
losses bL()  1  S=SFB places zero weight on industry prots:
First, Proposition 6 may also apply if the xed setup cost is allowed to vary
across rms as Kj. Suppose that the rst-best outcome still has the rm with max
producing where pj(XFB) = cj. Then it is easy to check that the argument from
(39) that bL()  1  S=SFB still holds. Of course, the lower bound on S=SFB is
independent of the Kjs, so bL()  max continues to apply.
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Second, the upper bound on welfare losses bL()  max thus also holds if some
 or indeed all  industry prots have been dissipated in form of socially wasteful
rent-seeking activities to gain market power (see, e.g., Posner, 1975).
9 Concluding remarks
Corporate managers and executive compensation in many industries place signi-
cant emphasis on measures of rm size. A model that incorporates such objectives
may thus, in some cases, provide a better reection of industry behaviour than a
standard model with prot-maximizing rms. This paper has analyzed welfare losses
due to imperfect competition where managers pursue strategic incentives based on
sales revenue.35 The framework presented also applies to a range of strategically
equivalent settings, including competition between oligopsonists (e.g., for retail bank
deposits) and strategic forward trading (e.g., in restructured electricity markets).
The results show that, with equilibrium incentives, welfare losses due to imper-
fect competition are likely to be less than 5 percent for many empirically relevant
market structures. Even a relatively small number of rms can be su¢ cient to yield
almost fully competitive outcomes. Their large impact on market performance sug-
gests that rmsstrategic incentives may also deserve more attention in antitrust
policy, perhaps most notably in merger analysis. In contrast to existing empirical
approaches, welfare losses can be estimated using only observable information on
rmsmarket shares (together with an assumption, estimate, or bounds for demand
curvature).
What could generate larger welfare losses in industries where managers pursue
rm size objectives? First, welfare losses can be signicantly higher than 5 percent if
rmsdemand curves are strongly concave and their market shares are asymmetric
in a particular way (see Extension A). Second, losses may also be higher if there
are signicant xed costs and excess entryrelative to rst-best (see Extension B).
Third, a welfare standard based on consumer surplus  rather than social surplus
35The other incentive contract considered in the recent literature on delegation is based on a
combination of prots and market share. (Jansen, van Lier and van Witteloostuijn (2007) and
Ritz (2008) show that market share contracts dominate incentives based on sales revenue in a
three-stage game in which symmetric oligopolists can initially choose between di¤erent contracts
in the additional stage.) For the simple case of a symmetric duopoly with linear demand, Ritz
(2008) shows that the strategic e¤ect   =
 
1 p2. Using this in the above framework yields
that equilibrium welfare losses L =
 p
2  1 =  2p2  12, or about 4 12 percent. This suggests
that the results are likely to be very similar to Proposition 2 above. Based on this, I conjecture
that, in general, welfare losses tend to be somewhat  but probably not much  higher with
market share contracts. It also seems likely that the limiting cases under which welfare losses go
to zero (from part (i) of Proposition 6) should continue to apply with market share incentives.
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as in the related literature  would also generate higher losses (see Extension C).
Fourth, higher losses may also be the result of collusive agreements between rms in
a dynamic model (where managerial incentives might also a¤ect cartel stability).36
Finally, it is clear that welfare losses could be substantially higher if rmsproducts
are also signicantly horizontally di¤erentiated.37
However, it is worth remembering that equilibrium welfare losses would be lower
than in the above analysis if the rst-best outcome is not attainable in practice.
For example, it may simply not be possible for the most e¢ cient rm to supply the
entire rst-best quantity to the market due to capacity constraints. Moreover, in a
setting with xed costs, it may be di¢ cult for the regulator to compensate a rm
for operating losses without creating additional distortions. Welfare losses relative
to a second-bestoptimum are generally smaller.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3. For part (i) of the proposition, the rst step of the proof
shows that L = 1
7
is the highest possible welfare loss for a duopoly, and the second
step then shows that welfare losses for n  2 always satisfy L  1
7
. For the rst
step, in the duopoly case with n = 2, the Herndahl index H = 2max + (1  max)2
so welfare losses from Proposition 1 become
L()jn=2 =
2max + 4(2max   1)(1  max)
(2 + max)2
 '(max): (41)
Di¤erentiating this expression gives that
'0(max) =
40
 
4
5
  max

(2 + max)4
, (42)
so max = 45 satises '
0(max) = 0. Since '00(max) < 0, it follows that L()jn=2 
'(max) =
1
7
. For the second step, note that L(n; max; H) is decreasing in H. Since
the Herndahl index
H  2max +
(1  max)2
(n  1)  H (43)
36See Lambertini and Trombetta (2002) for an analysis of the incentive to collude in a repeated
game with strategic incentives. I am not aware of any work on collusion under delegation with
asymmetric rms.
37For instance, if products are almost fully horizontally di¤erentiated, rms act almost like
independent monopolists (and there is only very little scope for strategic manipulation), so welfare
losses are also close to monopoly levels. See also Corchón and Zudenkova (2009).
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it follows that L(n; max; H)  L(n; max; H). (Note also that this holds with
equality for n = 2.) Replacing H with H in the formula for welfare losses from
Proposition 1 and some rearranging shows that L(n; max; H)  17 is equivalent to
 (n; max)  0, where
 (n; max)  2max

3 +
4
n

(44)
 

n  1
2
+
7
n

 

7  3
n
+
3
n2

2max.
Di¤erentiating this expression gives that
1
2
@ (n; max)
@max
=

3 +
4
n

 

7  3
n
+
3
n2

max: (45)
Since @2 (n; max)=@2max < 0, the largest rms market share that maximizes
 (n; max) solves @ (n; max)=@max = 0 and is given by
?max =

3 +
4
n


7  3
n
+
3
n2
 . (46)
It follows that  (n; max)   (n; ?max). (Note also that ?max = 45 = max for n = 2.)
Now using the expression for ?max in the formula for  (n; max) shows that
 (n; ?max) = 
?
max

3 +
4
n

 

n  1
2
+
7
n

, (47)
and so  (n; ?max)  0 whenever
?max 

n  1
2
+
7
n


3 +
4
n
  ~max. (48)
It is easy to conrm that ?max  ~max indeed holds for all n  2 (with equality only
for n = 2). It follows that  (n; max)   (n; ?max)  0, which in turn implies that
L(n; max; H)  L(n; max; H)  1
7
, (49)
as claimed. Part (ii) of the proposition now follows trivially by recalling that welfare
losses due to monopoly Lsym (1) =
1
4
(for example, by setting n = 1 in Proposition
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2). Part (iii) of the proposition can be seen by rewriting the formula for welfare
losses from Proposition 1 as
L(n; max; H) =
(max=n)
2 + 2 (max=n H=n)
(1 + max=n)2
, (50)
and, noting that max 2 [ 1n ; 1) and H 2 [ 1n ; 1) are both bounded, it follows that
limn!1 L(n; max; H) = 0, (51)
as claimed.
Proof of Proposition 4. Equilibrium welfare losses L(n; max; H) are decreas-
ing in H, and the Herndahl index H  2max + (1  max)2 =(n   1)  H, so
L(n; max; H)  L(n; max; H). From the proof of Proposition 2, L(n; max; H) 
L(n; ?max; H), where 
?
max is dened in (46), and note that L
(n; max; H) is decreas-
ing in max for all max  ?max. Since ?max 2 (37 ,45 ], it follows that L(n; max; H) 
L(n; 7
20
; H) for any max  720 . Replacing H with H in the formula for welfare losses
from Proposition 1 and some rearranging shows that
L(n; max; H) =
(n  1)2max + 2n(nmax   1)(1  max)
(n  1)(n+ max)2 (52)
and so
L(n; 7
20
; H) =
49(n  1) + 26n(7n  20)
(n  1)(20n+ 7)2 . (53)
Ignoring integer constraints for a moment, it is not di¢ cult to check that L(n; 7
20
; H)
is increasing (decreasing) in n for n smaller (larger) than n^  5:05, so L(n; 7
20
; H) 
L(n^; 7
20
; H). Since L(5; 7
20
; H)  4:69%  L(6; 7
20
; H)  4:56%, it follows that
L(n; 7
20
; H)  4:69%, where the latter is approximately equal to 42
3
%. Therefore
L(n; max; H)  L(n; max; H)  L(n; 720 ; H)  L(n^; 720 ; H)  423%
for any max  720 as claimed.
Proof of Proposition 5. With non-linear demand, by (34), the strategic e¤ect
follows from the rst-order condition for manager js output choice, @
j=@xj = 0,
dX j
dxj
=  

(n  1)  (1  j)(1  )
n  (1  j)(1  )

   j < 0. (54)
Furthermore, by (35), the rst-order condition for rm js choice of incentives,
34
dj=dj = 0, can be written as
sj   (X)

1 + j(1 +   j)

= 0. (55)
Summing the n rst-order conditions from (35) gives
s
Xn
j=1
j   (X)
Xn
j=1

1 + j(1 +   j)

= 0. (56)
Rearranging this shows that equilibrium industry output also satises
(X) =
s
Pn
j=1 jPn
j=1

1 + j(1 +   j)
 . (57)
Combining this with the rst-order condition from (55) shows that the rmsprof-
itability indices are related by
j =
Xn
j=1
j
 1 + j(1 +   j)Pn
j=1

1 + j(1 +   j)
 , (58)
and so also
Xn
j=1
jj =
Xn
j=1
j
 h1 + Pnj=1 2j(1 +   j)iPn
j=1

1 + j(1 +   j)
 . (59)
The remainder of the proof derives equilibrium consumer surplus, rm and industry
prots, generalized welfare, rst-best welfare, and, nally, a formula for generalized
welfare losses using these expressions.
Recalling the consumer utility function from (30) and the corresponding inverse
demand curve for rm j from (31), equilibrium consumer surplus can be written as
S =

s( + 1)
(X)+1 . (60)
Now using the expressions for industry output from (57) and the strategic e¤ects
from (54) yields
S =

( + 1)
s1=
2664
Xn
j=1
j
n+
Xn
j=1

j
n  (1  j)(1  )

3775
(+1)=
. (61)
Similarly, using (54), (57), (58), (59), and (61), rm js prots j = (pj   cj)xj 
35
K can, in equilibrium, be written as
j =

( + 1)2j
n  (1  j)(1  )

S  K. (62)
Therefore equilibrium industry prots are given byXn
j=1
j = ( + 1)
 eH=nS   nK (63)
where eH Xn
j=1

n2j
n  (1  j)(1  )

(64)
is the industrys adjusted Herndahl index.
Taken together, the expressions for equilibrium consumer surplus and industry
prots imply that generalized welfare,cW () = S+Pnj=1 j, in equilibrium becomes
cW () = h1 + ( + 1) eH=niS   nK. (65)
First-best welfare W FB =
 
SFB  K > 0, where SFB = [=( + 1)] s1=(+1)=max
is rst-best consumer surplus. Using (54), (58), and (59), and (61), rst-best con-
sumer surplus is related to equilibrium consumer surplus according to
SFB =

1 +
max
n  (1  max)(1  )
(+1)=
S (66)
Finally, therefore, generalized welfare losses bL() = 1 cW ()=W FB are, in equilib-
rium, given by
bL(n; max; eH; ;K=S; ) = 1  1 + 
"
( + 1)
eH
n
  nK
S
#

1 +
max
n  (1  max)(1  )
(+1)=
  K
S
, (67)
as claimed.
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